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We investigate how differential exposures by German banks to the US real estate market 
affect domestic lending in Germany when home prices started to decline in the US.  
We find that banks with an exposure to the US real estate sector and to conduits shift their 
domestic lending to industry–region combinations with lower insolvency ratios following a 
decrease in US home prices. These banks also contract their lending to German firms 
more than banks that do not have such exposure. We mainly document that possible loss-
es abroad shift bank lending at home where the size of the effect depends on the type and 
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By mid–2006 real estate prices in the US began to plummet, triggering the US subprime 
mortgage crisis that led to a global financial crisis. While the main focus was on the fragility 
of the financial system (and, to some extent, the regulatory focus is still on how to re–
establish a healthy banking industry), the initial policy reaction relied mostly on monetary 
tools. These measures proved to be not entirely effective due to the presence of excessive 
household debt coupled with decreasing home prices. The crisis may not have been as 
severe, it is often argued now, if those underlying problems had have been addressed in a 
first and foremost step (Mian and Sufi (2014)).1 
German banks, too, experienced considerable loan losses and given solvency consid-
erations consequently more binding capital constraints. This was largely attributed to their 
various exposures to the US real estate market. In addition to their direct lending to US 
firms in the real estate sector and to major subprime lenders, German banks also became 
exposed by providing liquidity support in the form of credit lines to their asset–backed 
commercial paper (ABCP) conduits. 
The first banks that had to be bailed out by a government during the financial crisis 
were actually two German banks, IKB Deutsche Industriebank and Sachsen Landesbank. 
The deteriorating quality of their assets and the panic on the ABCP market forced these 
German banks to write off the liquidity lines they had provided to their ABCP conduits. 
These write–offs resulted in considerable losses on their balance sheets. In general, the 
Landesbanks’ substantial exposures to US mortgage–backed securities through their 
ABCP conduits, which were higher than those of the big German banks, led to the collapse 
or bail–out of various Landesbanks. 
Given these differences, we therefore investigate how each type of exposure in the US 
real estate market influenced domestic lending in Germany. We first suitably document the 
                                                
1 Allen and Carletti (2013) show that risk shifting and asset substitution can result in a bubble in real estate prices. 
2 
overall contraction in lending that occurred in Germany, then focus on the heterogeneity in 
the contraction taking place across banks and firms. We are mainly interested in studying 
whether ‒ when home prices started to decline in the US ‒ differences in bank exposures 
to the US real estate market started to determine bank lending in Germany according to 
firm risk.2 In other words: Is there a flight to quality in domestic lending depending on the 
degree of the German banks’ exposures in the US – following the decline in US home 
prices? 
In terms of credit volume we find that banks that had a direct exposure to the US real 
estate sector contracted their lending in Germany by more following a decrease in US 
home prices than banks that did not have such exposure. This effect is both statistically 
significant and economically relevant. For example, a bank with a €1 billion exposure to 
the US real estate sector, and following a decrease by 5 index points (which is equal to 
two standard deviations) in the S&P/Case–Shiller US National Home Price Index, is esti-
mated to contract its quarterly lending in Germany by 1.19 percentage points more than a 
bank with no such exposure. This is a large effect given that the mean (median) quarterly 
loan growth during the sample period equals –2.48 (–0.71) percent. And a bank with €1 
billion conduit exposure is estimated to contract its quarterly lending in Germany by 1.47 
percentage points more than banks without conduits in place following a decrease by 5 in-
dex points in home prices. 
In terms of credit composition, we find clear evidence of a flight to quality.  For example, 
a bank with a €1 billion exposure to the US real estate sector, and following a decrease by 
5 index points in the S&P/Case–Shiller US National Home Price Index, is estimated to 
contract its quarterly lending in Germany to firms in riskier industry–region combinations 
(i.e., those with a 1 percentage point higher insolvency rate) by 4.01 percentage points 
more than a bank with no such exposure. A bank with €1 billion conduit exposure is esti-
mated to contract its quarterly lending to such riskier industry–region pairs by 3.43 per-
                                                
2 Our findings are unlikely to be driven by major regulatory changes as the sample period ends in 2009 whereas Basel III, for 
instance, developed by the Basel Committee to strengthen the banking sector, was not introduced before December 2010 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010)). 
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centage points more than banks without conduits in place when US home prices decrease 
by 5 index points. Overall, these findings imply that possible losses abroad may not only 
cut but also shift bank lending at home. 
Our results thereby vividly demonstrate how the recent globalization in banking activi-
ties may be inevitably linked to financial stability. In particular, economic fluctuations in one 
country are transmitted to other countries through this bank exposure channel. As the 
largest European economy and as a bank–based system, where bank financing plays a 
crucial role for corporations of all sizes, Germany is particularly interesting to pursue this 
analysis. These characteristics of the financial system enable us to focus on how affected 
banks change their lending towards domestic firms, which has an influence on the real 
economy as well. 
We are clearly not the first to study (and for identification purposes ‘exploit’) the interna-
tional transmission of shocks through the banking sector. However ours is the first paper to 
investigate the type and the level of the exposures to the US real estate market by non–
US banks and how these exposures influence both the volume and the composition of lo-
cal lending depending on the US home price shock. In terms of identification, our approach 
is superior to extant work on this topic because we use the actual real estate exposures to 
the US, which is “ground zero” for the financial crisis, and because we focus on the initial 
exogenous shock in the US home prices in combination with those “ground zero” expo-
sures. Additionally, we study lending taking place in another country (different from the cri-
sis country) with the information from a comprehensive credit register providing strong 
controls for local credit demand. 
Our research follows the seminal work by Peek and Rosengren (1997) and Peek and 
Rosengren (2000) who show that when parent banks are faced with a (funding) shock, this 
can negatively affect lending by their foreign affiliates.3 In particular Peek and Rosengren 
                                                
3 Recent research confirms that, during the global financial crisis, global banks transmitted shocks across borders through 
their local affiliates (see, among others, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011); Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012); Albertazzi and 
Bottero (2013); Claessens and van Horen (2013); Cull and Martinez Peria (2013); Allen et al. (2014); Bertay (2014); de 
Haas and van Lelyveld (2014); Ongena, Peydró and van Horen (2015); and Acharya, Afonso and Kovner (2017)). 
4 
(1997) identify a supply shock to bank lending in the US through US branches of Japanese 
banks, which was caused by the decline in Japanese stock market values. Unlike the pre-
vious studies trying to examine the relationship between capital ratios and the overall vol-
ume of lending, their study actually disentangles loan supply from loan demand by focus-
ing on the transmission of the capital effects of the Japanese stock market declines. Their 
paper documents that the Japanese banks’ capital ratios significantly determine its com-
mercial and industrial lending in the US. Using similar data, Peek and Rosengren (2000) 
investigate the change in commercial real estate loans in spatially separated markets, 
which enables them to examine the impact of this loan supply shock on the real economic 
activity in the US. 
A recent paper (and closest to ours) is a paper by Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2011). 
They investigate the impact of the financial crises on the credit supply of German savings 
banks. Here, the transmission occurs through savings banks’ holdings in Landesbanks 
that were exposed to subprime mortgages.4 This mechanism is somewhat different from 
the one in Peek and Rosengren since an external financial shock is transmitted to a do-
mestic market through the exposure of the domestic banks. For that reason, it becomes 
even more important and potentially more difficult to isolate the loan supply effect. Puri, 
Rocholl and Steffen (2011) disentangle supply from demand effects by employing infor-
mation coming from the loan application process. The authors find that affected savings 
banks reject more loan applications than non–affected banks. However, close bank–firm 
relationships help to mitigate the loan supply shock. 
A number of features distinguish our paper from theirs. First, having access to unique 
and confidential supervisory data, we know the actual time–varying exposures to the US 
real estate market (direct lending to the US real estate sector, to major subprime lenders, 
and conduit exposures) of all German banks. Combined with the US home price shock, 
                                                
4 Other papers studying the international transmission through the asset side of the banks include De Haas and Van Horen 
(2013) and Popov and Van Horen (2015). The former paper examines syndicated loans and finds that crisis–related write–
downs negatively affected cross–border bank lending. The latter paper finds that large holdings of impaired sovereign debt 
negatively affected bank lending during the European sovereign debt crisis. Cuñat, Cvijanovic' and Yuan (2013) study the 
domestic transmission of real estate price shocks within the US using bank balance sheets. Ahrend and Goujard (2015) 
document that shocks to bank balance–sheets are able to predict systemic banking crises in debtor countries. 
5 
these exposures to the US real estate market allow us to identify possible (but at the time 
not yet publicly observable) bank losses. In contrast, Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2011) rely 
on ex post publicly reported distress at three Landesbanks that led to a decline in the val-
ue of equity held by savings banks present in their loan data set. Thus our data set ena-
bles us to assess the time–varying effects of various types of German bank exposures to 
the US real estate market throughout the entire crisis period, not just the presumed 
(though plausible) impact through indirect linkages within parts of the German banking 
system.5 
Second, to identify the changes in lending we rely on credit register data that cover the 
entire banking sector in Germany, not just savings banks. We match this data with bank 
and market characteristics. Finally, we examine the resultant changes not only in the ag-
gregate volume but also in the composition of bank lending in Germany across corpora-
tions, industries and regions as we want to investigate whether there is a ‘flight to quality’ 
in lending in Germany for those banks that were more exposed to the US real estate mar-
ket. 
In this respect, our paper also contributes to an extant literature that examines the flight 
to quality or loan strictness following negative shocks affecting banks (Lang and Nakamura 
(1995); Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996); Murfin (2012); Becker and Ivashina 
(2016)), or documents bank risk–taking following expansionary monetary shocks (e.g., 
Jiménez et al. (2014); Ioannidou, Ongena and Peydró (2015); Dell‘Ariccia, Laeven and 
Suarez (2017)). These also include studies on bank security portfolios during the crisis 
where a similar pattern is observed through the purchase of high quality assets by banks. 
Hildebrand, Rocholl and Schulz (2012) for example investigate banks’ investment strate-
gies in Germany and find that banks prefer to purchase securities that are eligible as col-
lateral when borrowing from the ECB. This behavior is more pronounced for less healthy 
                                                
5 Not all savings banks were directly exposed to the US real estate market, however they were affected through their link 
with the Landesbanks during the crisis. We, on the other hand, focus on the initial shock and not on the spillovers to other 
banks. However, since we cover the crisis period as well, we re–estimate our model by excluding the savings banks from 
our sample. The results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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or large banks, and for banks that are exposed to Greek bonds. Beber, Brandt and 
Kavajecz (2009), on the other hand, examine whether investment decisions are driven by 
quality or liquidity concerns, and they find that during distressed times, investors prefer li-
quidity rather than credit quality. In that respect, both papers point to the importance of li-
quidity in investment decisions as well. However, changes in lending behavior are more 
likely to be driven by default risk only, especially if securitization is not an option. This fea-
ture distinguishes our paper from that strand of literature. 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss the vari-
ous exposures German banks have in the US and their lending to firms in Germany. In 
Section III we describe the data and the definition of the variables of interest. We discuss 
the methodology and present the main estimation results in Section IV. Section V con-
cludes. 
2. Portfolios of German Banks 
Asset–Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) conduits set up by German banks performed 
maturity transformation by purchasing long–term assets and issuing asset–backed com-
mercial paper, a short–term debt instrument which is often used to raise capital. The 
ABCP were primarily sold to money market funds (MMFs) and rolled over at regular inter-
vals. Nevertheless, ABCP conduits used to be off–balance sheet vehicles and represented 
the agents of the “shadow banking” market, which appeared to be less regulated. There-
fore, German banks could hold assets in their ABCP conduits without providing a sufficient 
amount of the required capital. 
ABCP conduits were designed to protect investors from declines in the market value of 
the underlying assets. Sponsoring banks provided liquidity support to their ABCP conduits. 
According to Moody’s (2007): “Most programmes have 100% committed liquidity support 
that can be drawn to repay ABCP up to the par value of non–defaulted assets, regardless 
7 
of market value.” In cases where ABCP conduits experienced difficulties, credit risk at-
tributed to the ABCP conduits effectively put a strain on their parent banks. 
Being a safe haven for investors before the crisis, ABCP conduits played a central role 
in the financial crisis 2007–2009 when news about the deteriorating quality of US subprime 
mortgages roiled the financial markets and the market for ABCP froze with risk–averse in-
vestors being unwilling to purchase and roll over maturing ABCP (Acharya and Schnabl 
(2010); Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010)).6 7 
At the end of July 2007 the US subprime mortgage crisis reached its first victim in Ger-
many. On July 31th, 2007, Frankfurter Allgemeine indeed reported about the failure of the 
IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG – a bank which financed mainly medium–sized enterpris-
es. IKB failed on a large credit line provided to its conduit Rhineland Funding Capital which 
amounted to €12.7 billion. The IKB failure unfortunately did not remain an isolated incident. 
In the mid of August 2007 the next bank – SachenLB – made the headlines in the 
newspapers. On the August 22nd, 2007, the Financial Times wrote: “SachsenLB, a public-
ly–owned Landesbank, or a state bank, became the second German financial institution in 
three weeks to be forced to accept an emergency rescue, with fellow savings banks taking 
over a €17.3 billion credit facility.” As quoted also by the other newspapers such as Fran-
furter Allgemeine on August 10th and later by Handelsblatt on the November 9th the 24th 
biggest German bank SachsenLB had been running one of the world biggest conduits 
called Ormond Quay. The financing needs of SachsenLB raised to €17.5 billion and ex-
ceeded its own capital by more than ten times. 
The Financial Times titled its article “’Not uncritical’ Subprime exposure drags down 
German banks” and characterized the situation in Germany as the following: “The crisis 
focuses on German public banks, in particular the Landesbanks … .”8 As the reasons for 
                                                
6 On 31 July, 2007, the news about the bankruptcy of the two Bear Stearns’ hedge funds invested in subprime mortgages 
reached the market. On 7 August 2007, the French Bank BNP Paribas pronounced its withdrawals from its three funds due 
to an inability to judge the “fair” value of their holdings. 
7 Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2013) document that it was banks and not investors that were negatively affected because 
banks had insured outside investors by providing explicit guarantees to conduits. 
8 The Financial Times published the list of German banks and their conduits with the amounts of credit facilities provided. 
From the list it is possible to observe that not only the big banks but also a lot of Landesbanks had been involved in this 
8 
the Landesbanks to be involved in such risky activities the Financial Times pointed on the 
one hand to the effects of rising competition and capital requirements and on the other 
hand to the declining earnings opportunities in the home markets. 
Between August 2007 and the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in September 2008, the 
ABCP market was seriously stressed. In this period, the total value of ABCP outstanding 
decreased by 37 percent, from $1.18 trillion to $745 billion. However, the cost of issuing 
overnight ABCP relative to the US Federal Reserve Funds rate also jumped from 10 to 
150 basis points after the news of the withdrawals from BNP Paribas. On September 16th, 
2008, the Reserve Primary Fund – a large MMF – announced considerable losses on its 
holdings of Lehman Brothers’ CP. This, in turn triggered a run on the MMF industry and 
led to the reduction of holdings of all types of CP by MMFs. After Lehman Brothers’ col-
lapse, German banks, which were already weakened by the need to meet their obligations 
on maturing ABCP, came under further pressure. 
Credit growth in Germany has been characterized by various fluctuations since 2002. 
The annual growth rate of lending to domestic firms rose sharply from –0.1 percent in May 
2007 to 3.8 percent in July 2008, whereas a remarkable drop was observed starting only 
from the third quarter of 2008 onwards (Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report, 9/2009). 
The annual growth in lending declined by 2.7 percentage points to 1.1 percent between 
July 2008 and July 2009. The rest of the euro area, on the other hand, witnessed a sharp-
er decline in lending than Germany, and also at an earlier point in time – at the end of 
2007. The slowdown in lending is found to be situated in the non–financial industry. 
Growth in lending declined sharply especially for those banking groups that were hit par-
ticularly hard by the global financial crisis. 
                                                                                                                                                  
kind of risky activity. SachsenLB, LBBW (Landebank Baden–Württemberg), WestLB and BayernLB were among the 
Landesbanks with especially large engagements. 
9 
3. Data and Variables 
3.1 Data Sources 
We employ a unique matched firm–bank level dataset that contains quarterly infor-
mation from the 1st quarter of 2005 to the 4th quarter of 2009. The data combine five data-
bases: (1) the Deutsche Bundesbank’s credit register (MiMik), (2) Moody’s ABCP Query, 
(3) bank balance sheet data (Bista, BAKIS), (4) regional firm insolvencies per industry, and 
(5) home price indices (S&P/Case–Shiller). These data sources make it possible to ob-
serve the individual lending behavior of German banks to domestic firms, and to combine 
this information with the exposure of German banks to the real estate sector in the US, to 
subprime lenders in the US, and to their conduits engaged in the US market, as well as to 
use the firm and bank–specific information. 
The credit register (MiMik) is the main data source for the individual exposures of Ger-
man banks to firms.9 The credit register contains information on large exposures of €1.5 
million (formerly 3 million Deutsche Mark) and above.10 Therefore exposures to small and 
medium–sized firms might be underrepresented in this database. However, if the sum of 
the exposures to firms in a “borrower unit”, i.e., a group of affiliated companies, exceeds 
the threshold of €1.5 million, the individual exposure to a firm in that group is reported, 
even if it is a very small exposure. This reporting partly abates the extant bias in the credit 
register towards medium and large–sized firms. Moreover, large firms play a relatively 
more important role in our analysis since they represent a larger portion of the borrowing in 
total. At individual level, large firms potentially borrow from large banks in large volumes 
that may be adjusted swiftly. Therefore, we believe that the threshold helps to make our 
                                                
9 Details on the credit register can be found in Schmieder (2006), and in published work by Schertler, Buch and von 
Westernhagen (2006), Hayden, Porath and von Westernhagen (2007) and Ongena, Tümer–Alkan and von Westernhagen 
(2012), for example. The Bundesbank also maintains a website with papers based on its credit register. Recent prominent 
examples include, e.g., Behn, Haselmann and Wachtel (2016) and Haselmann, Schoenherr and Vig (2017). 
10 If exposures of €1.5 million or above existed during the reporting period but are partly or fully repaid, the remaining expo-
sure is reported even if the amount is zero. We take the actual amounts of the exposures into consideration. 
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control group more comparable to the group of banks that were exposed to the US real es-
tate market, in effect similar to a matching exercise. 
Bank exposures to firms in the credit register are defined fairly broadly, e.g., they in-
clude not only corporate loans but also corporate bonds and other securities which belong 
to the non–trading stock.11 In the credit register we are able to distinguish between on–
balance sheet and off–balance sheet items.12 We choose to use only on–balance sheet 
positions, since the inclusion of off–balance sheet exposures leads to an overstatement of 
the actual exposures due to guarantees provided by banks (to other banks for exposures 
that were already covered in on–balance sheet items). 
Based on individual bank exposures to firms, banks and other financial institutions, the 
credit register covers both domestic and foreign exposures and contains the information 
on country code and industry classification within a particular country. This structure of the 
credit register allows us to identify both individual bank exposures to the real estate sector 
as well as to the top subprime lenders in the US, and enables us to study the impact of 
these exposures on the lending of German banks to domestic firms. The credit register 
contains also information on firm quality, however for restricted periods in the sample. 
Therefore, we augment the available information with the industry–level number of firm de-
faults within particular German Federal States from the Federal Statistical Office. This in-
formation on the industry number of firm defaults (Insolvency) makes it possible to differ-
entiate between the lending behavior of German banks towards firms with high and low 
quality. 
The second database we use is the Moody’s ABCP Query. From this database we take 
the information on all important conduits of German banks and on the amount of liquidity 
                                                
11 For a more detailed definition of the bank exposures, see Section 19 of the Banking Act (The versions applied before 
01.01.2014). The following items are deemed not to be bank exposures: exposures to German central and local govern-
ments and communities, securities in the trading stock, undrawn loan commitments, shares in other enterprises etc. For a 
more detailed definition on the exceptions of the bank exposures, see Section 20 of the Banking Act (The versions applied 
before 01.01.2014). 
12 For example, lease receivables, mortgage loans, publicly guaranteed loans, and inter–bank loans (with a residual maturity 
of up to one year) were listed separately before 2008 under on–balance sheet activities. Off–balance sheet items included 
derivatives (other than written option positions), guarantees assumed to cover these and other off–balance sheet transac-
tions (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1998). However, since 2008 the structure of items listed separately has changed to some 
extent. But the main structure due to which we are able to distinguish between on–balance sheet and off–balance sheet 
activities has remained unchanged. 
11 
provision of German banks to their conduits. However, this information is available in the 
Moody’s ABCP Query only starting in 2007. For 2005 and 2006 we hand–collect this in-
formation from two Moody’s publications: “A Performance Overview for EMEA ABCP con-
duits” and “A Program Review for US conduits”. This information allows us to study the 
impact of the German bank exposure to their conduits on lending behavior to domestic 
firms. Similar to the real estate exposure in the US and exposure to the subprime lenders 
in the US (taken from the credit register), the German bank exposure to their conduits is 
quarterly and is aggregated at the bank level. 
We borrow the majority of our bank–specific variables from the monthly balance sheet 
statistics (Bista) and some of our bank–specific variables from BAKIS. BAKIS is the Infor-
mation System, which is shared between the Deutsche Bundesbank and BaFin (the Ger-
man Federal Banking Supervisory Office). It contains the bank balance sheets for all Ger-
man banks. We select the monthly balance sheet statistics and match them with the credit 
register on a quarterly basis. Some risk indicators, such as, e.g., non–performing loans, 
are not available in Bista and we extract them on a yearly basis from BAKIS. 
Finally, to capture the price developments in the US real estate market, we access the 
S&P/Case–Shiller Home Price Indices. 
3.2 Sample 
Over the time period from the 1st quarter of 2005 to the 4th quarter of 2009 we consider 
2,031 banks that provide domestic balance–sheet loans to 336,990 firms in Germany. In 
total we have 3.9 million bank–firm–quarter observations of domestic on–balance–sheet 
lending. However, a number of bank mergers took place during this time period. We carry 
out a merger correction procedure by creating a new separate bank after the merger.13 Of 
the 2,031 banks involved, 90 banks have direct exposure to the US real estate sector, 142 
banks have direct exposure to subprime lenders and 20 banks have conduit exposure. In a 
                                                
13 Our approach is based on separating the pre–merger banks from the merged bank. In the end, we have three banks, 
which are treated independently from each other. We repeat this procedure as often as a merger takes place. Each time a 
newly merged bank receives a new identification number, we drop the target banks in that year (or quarter). 
12 
final step we match the datasets discussed in Section 3.1, and we end up with 1,664,262 
bank–firm–quarter observations available for the whole set of variables for our main mod-
el. 
 
[Tables 1 and 2 Here] 
 
Tables 1 and 2 contain variable definitions and their summary statistics. The latter sug-
gest that the sample selection is fortunately minimal. It is also worth noting that the change 
in log domestic lending has negative mean and median values: –0.025 and –0.007, re-
spectively. In Figure 1 Panel A and B, we present the mean values of bank exposures, US 
home prices and domestic lending growth over time. We observe that as home prices de-
crease lending growth in Germany contracts as well, which is more pronounced for banks 
that were exposed to the US real estate sector. 
3.3 Bank Exposure to Real Estate, Subprime and Conduits 
German banks were engaged in at least three ways in the US real estate market: Some 
banks had direct (regular) exposures to the US real estate sector on their balance sheets, 
some banks had exposures to subprime lenders in the US, and some banks had asset–
backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits in place.14 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Table 3 gives a detailed overview of German banks’ portfolios based on the credit regis-
ter data by distinguishing between on and off–balance sheet exposures in 2007. The up-
per panel of the table provides the regional distribution of exposures to the real estate sec-
tor, including Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, offshore centers, the US and all foreign 
                                                
14 Ferreira and Gyourko (2015) document that the crisis was more due to prime borrowers, in contrast to the common belief 
that it was caused by subprime borrowers. We also consider this finding when classifying the exposures in the analysis. 
We start the analysis by investigating the direct exposure to the US real estate market that includes prime borrowers as 
well. After that we assess the role of the exposures to subprime lenders in the US. 
13 
countries.15 We can clearly see that German banks’ exposure to US firms in the real estate 
sector was significantly higher than exposures to any of the other countries’ firms in the 
same sector. Whereas US real estate exposure exceeds €30 billion, the second highest 
exposure, which is to offshore centers, totals only €13.6 billion, while the third highest, 
which is to Spain, equals €10.6 billion. Moreover, US real estate exposure was potentially 
the first to be struck by a collapse in home prices and this exposure will therefore experi-
ence the “cleanest” (identifiable) shock to real estate during the crisis. We also note that 
we ended our sample period in 2009, in order to have a cleaner setting and not to include 
the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis. 
Table 3 also breaks down the exposures by three types, i.e., on and off–balance sheet 
exposures and derivatives. The fraction of the on–balance sheet exposures ranges from 
87 to 92 percent for all three types of exposures, which explains our later approach of fo-
cusing on these on–balance sheet exposures. The rest of the table lists the outstanding 
loans to US banks (€157 billion) and the total exposure to offshore centers (€148 billion). It 
is not surprising that the structure of lending to banks differs from the direct exposure to 
the real estate sector as the former consists of similar shares of on and off–balance sheet 
exposures due to a higher share of derivatives. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
The bulk of the German banks’ engagement in the US subprime mortgage market took 
place through the investment activities of their ABCP conduits, however.16 Table 4 pro-
vides the US real estate, subprime and conduit exposures for all German banks in 
2007Q2. For the mean bank among the 1,547 banks in our sample, direct real estate ex-
posure in 2007Q2, for example, was equal to €17.7 million, exposure to major subprime 
                                                
15 During the Eurozone crisis, Greece, Ireland and Portugal received bail–out funds of €148.6, €54.9 and €61.4 billion, re-
spectively. Another Eurozone member, Spain, experienced problems in the real estate sector reflected in decreasing home 
prices. Finally, exposure to offshore centers is an indication of SPV exposures. 
16 Since the credit register does not contain exposures to ABCP conduits, we do not include the information on those expo-
sures in Table 3. The data on ABCP conduits comes from Moody’s ABCP Query and is discussed in Table 4. 
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lenders equal to €1.3 million, and conduit exposure equal to €81.3 million. Among the 41 
banks with real estate exposures, the mean (median) exposure amounted to €666.8 
(€161.8) million; for the 78 banks with subprime exposures, the mean (median) exposure 
was equal to €25 (€5) million; while for the 13 banks with conduits, the mean (median) ex-
posure was equal to €9.7 (€5.7) billion. Relative to total assets, real estate exposure aver-
ages to 0.92 percent whereas ratios for subprime exposure and conduit exposure are doc-
umented as 0.27 percent and 2.83 percent, respectively. While acknowledging that only a 
small number of banks were exposed, we also note that these banks are lenders to a 
much higher number of borrowers compared to the rest of the banks without exposure. 
This is observable in the number of observations of the exposed group to the total number 
as ranging from 25 to 35 percent (see the later Table 6 for example). In other words, these 
exposed banks have an important role in overall domestic lending. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
In Table 5 Panel A, we present the correlations between US real estate, subprime and 
conduit exposures. They are all highly correlated but the highest correlation is observed 
between the US real estate and conduit exposures. In Panel B, we classify banks based 
on banking group and exposure type in 2007Q2. We observe that all big banks were ex-
posed to the US real estate market, while 11 out of 12 Landesbanks were involved in lend-
ing to this sector. Surprisingly, even a few savings banks and cooperative banks had US 
real estate exposure whereas 33 savings banks and 23 cooperative banks had lending 
exposures to US subprime lenders. As expected, those two groups were not involved in 
providing liquidity to conduits.17 
When measuring bank exposures to financial shocks in the US, we differentiate be-
tween direct and indirect bank exposures. Direct exposures are taken from the credit regis-
                                                
17 In robustness we re–estimate our main models excluding savings banks (and then also cooperative banks). We will dis-
cuss the unaffected results later. 
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ter and appear talis qualis on banks’ balance sheets. Under indirect exposure, we consider 
the amount of liquidity that German banks provided to their conduits before and in the af-
termath of the US crisis. These exposures are considered to be off–balance sheet and 
thus do not directly appear on banks’ balance sheets in the event that banks’ conduits run 
into trouble. 
More precisely, we define the three different bank exposures in the US as follows. The 
first one is the Log US Real Estate Exposureit which is the logarithm of the total exposure 
of bank i in a particular quarter t to the US real estate sector.18 More specifically, the varia-
ble is defined as the logarithm of one plus the exposure in order to retain the banks in the 
sample that do not have any exposure to the US real estate sector. We use the same ap-
proach for the other exposures as well. This information is taken directly from the credit 
register. US Real Estate Exposureit is accumulated across individual bank–firm level expo-
sures to the US real estate sector (and therefore varies at the bank level but does not vary 
across firms borrowing from the same bank when we assess the changes in lending at the 
bank–firm level). 
We also define Log US Subprime Exposureit as the logarithm of the total exposure of 
bank i in a particular quarter t to the subprime lenders in the US. Again this information is 
taken directly from the credit register. We gathered information on the top 25 subprime 
lenders in the US which experienced difficulties during the US mortgage crisis. However, 
the German banks have been exposed to 18 of these top subprime lenders.19 US Sub-
prime Exposureit is accumulated across the individual exposures to subprime lenders in 
the US and therefore varies only by bank. 
Finally, we define the Log Conduit Exposureit as the logarithm of the total amount of li-
quidity provided by bank i in a particular quarter t to its ABCP conduits. The information on 
the liquidity lines is taken from Moody’s ABCP Query. Log Conduit Exposureit is accumu-
                                                
18 In this respect we follow the recent literature (e.g., Jiménez et al. (2014), Ongena, Peydró and van Horen (2015)). By con-
trolling for bank size we consider the relative importance of these exposures at the bank level. We also replace absolute 
exposures with relative exposures (Exposure over Capital) in unreported estimations. The results remain virtually un-
changed. 
19 The 18 top subprime lenders have been identified in the credit register as borrower units. In total, 123 enterprises in the 
credit register belong to those 18 top subprime lenders. 
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lated across individual exposures to ABCP conduits and therefore varies again only by 
bank. Recall that the definition and measurement of bank exposures to financial shocks in 
the US and all other variables was summarized in Table 1. 
3.4 Assessing Domestic Bank–Firm Lending In Germany 
Our model explains the quarterly change in lending, representing the first difference of 




where Domestic Lendingijt represents exposure of bank i to firm j in Germany in a par-
ticular quarter t. 
If the exposures were fully repaid during the quarter, zero values are reported at the 
end of the quarter in the dataset. However, in our analysis we capture only non–zero ex-
posures and therefore predominately focus on continuing changes in domestic lending, 
i.e., the “internal margin”. 
We have around 3.9 million bank–firm–quarter observations to assess domestic lending 
by banks to firms. We note that average domestic lending in our sample appears to be 
much lower compared to the average US real estate exposure, the average subprime ex-
posure and the average conduit exposure. This is the case because large banks in particu-
lar have such exposures. 
Table 6 compares the number of observations for banks with and without exposures to 
the real estate sector, subprime or conduits. These sub–samples are not mutually exclu-
sive. The sub–sample of banks with real estate exposure has over 1.4 million bank–firm–
quarter observations of domestic lending. The average bank–firm level amount of domes-
tic lending in this sub–sample equals €6 million and is somewhat larger than average do-
mestic lending for the total sample. It should be mentioned that banks with conduit expo-
   
1-ijtijtijt Lending Domestic logLending Domestic log Lending Domestic log Δ 
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sures belong to the same sub–sample. However, a couple of banks have subprime expo-
sures although they do not have real estate exposures. 
 
[Table 6 Here] 
 
The sub–sample of banks with subprime exposure provides us with 926,000 bank–firm–
quarter observations of domestic lending. The average domestic lending for this sub–
sample amounts to €5.7 million. Also a number of banks do have direct exposure to the 
US real estate sector and provide liquidity to conduits although they do not offer loans to 
subprime lenders. 
We note that the number of banks that provide liquidity to conduits is significantly 
smaller compared to the sub–samples discussed before. The sub–sample of banks with 
conduit exposure provides us with only around 426,000 bank–firm–quarter observations of 
domestic lending. Similar to the sub–samples with direct exposure to the real estate sector 
and the one with subprime exposure, the average for domestic lending in this sub–sample, 
at €5.9 million, tends to be larger than the average for the total sample. 
4. Explaining Domestic Bank–Firm Lending in Germany 
4.1 Specifications 
In Table 7 we run the growth in domestic bank lending in Germany on different types of 
exposures, starting with total US exposure (total exposure to the US real estate market), 
followed by a classification of our main variables of interest; US real estate exposure, US 
subprime exposure and conduit exposure, and various interactions that are introduced in 
18 
different models, for the sample that consists of the 1,664,262 bank–firm–quarter credit 
exposures.20 
We are particularly interested in the interaction of the exposures with: (1) the change in 
US home prices to gauge the impact of this incoming shock on the volume of bank lend-
ing, on the one hand; and with (2) the change in US home prices and insolvency to gauge 
the impact of the incoming shock on the composition of bank lending, on the other hand. 




where ∆log Domestic Lendingijt is the growth of domestic lending (measured as the 
quarter–on–quarter logarithmic change in domestic lending by bank i to firm j in quarter t). 
In terms of exposure by German banks in the US, we distinguish between Total US Expo-
sureit–1, US Real Estate Exposureit–1, Subprime Exposureit–1 and Conduit Exposureit–1. ∆US 
Homepricest is the change in US home prices while Insolvencyjt–1 defines the firm insol-
vency rate and proxies for firm quality at the industry–region level. The bank controls we 
feature are: Size (log of total assets), Capital (leverage ratio), Liquidity (short term assets 
to total assets), ROA (return on assets), NPL (Non–performing loans to total loans), De-
posits (deposits to total liabilities) and CB Funding (central bank funding to total assets).21 
                                                
20 This is the number of observations of the estimated model that includes all controls. Due to the very large number of firms 
and banks in the sample we follow customary Stata practice by demeaning first at the firm level and then “absorbing” the 
fixed effects at the bank level, thereby deflating the R–squares. 
21 We use the leverage ratio (total equity over total assets) as a measure of capital constraints. Using regulatory capital as an 
alternative measure does not affect the results. We also control for bank funding because banks that obtain financing from 




 1 log Exposureit -1   2US Housepricest  3Insolvency jt -1
 4 log Exposureit -1 *  US Housepricest    5 log Exposureit -1 * Insolvency jt -1  




  i  j   ijt
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All specifications include comprehensive sets of bank and also firm fixed effects ( and  
) .22 ɛijt is the error term. 
 
[Table 7 Here] 
 
We employ sets of three specifications for each exposure type, always starting with a 
simple model without any interactions, a second model with the interaction of exposure 
and US home prices, and a third model with the double and triple interactions with insol-
vency.  
Each third specification, and also the final one which includes the triple interaction term, 
can help answer one of our main research questions: “Is there a flight to quality in bank 
lending in Germany when home prices in the US decline, and does the strength of this ef-
fect depend on the degree of the German banks’ exposure to real estate, subprime and 
conduits in the US? 
4.2 Control Variables 
We start by discussing the estimated coefficients on the control variables, after which 
we turn to the coefficients of main interest on the double and triple interaction terms that 
include exposures. 
Among bank control variables, most estimated coefficients have the expected sign but 
only the estimated coefficients on deposits and central bank funding are statistically signif-
icant. Representative estimates in this regard from Model 1, for example, equal 3.970*** 
and 6.737***, respectively.23 These estimates imply that a one percentage point increase 
in the deposit ratio increases the growth in lending by 0.04 percentage points, and that a 
one percentage point increase in central bank funding increases it by 0.07 percentage 
                                                
22 Because we are mainly interested in the effect of bank–level exposures over time, including bank–time fixed effects is 
problematic. Because few firms in Germany rely on multiple banks that are differentiated by their exposures in the US, in-
cluding firm–time fixed effects equally robs the estimations of most if not all of their relevant variation. We discuss these is-
sues further in Subsection 4.4. 
23 *** Significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, and * significant at 10 percent. For convenience we will also indicate 




points.24 For comparison; we note that the mean growth of domestic loans across all 
bank–firm–quarter observations equals –2.5 percent. These findings suggest that banks 
that rely on deposits and central bank funding increase lending to corporations. This is not 
surprising when taking into account the difficulties certain institutions faced in accessing 
wholesale markets as well as the ECB’s willingness to provide liquidity. The rest of the 
control variables, although all imprecisely estimated, imply that smaller, capitalized, liquid 
and profitable banks increase lending which all corresponds to priors. The positive coeffi-
cient for the non–performing loans (also insignificant) can be attributed to a mechanical re-
lationship since non–performing loans are reported in the credit register data and continue 
to exist until they are written off. 
Next we discuss the estimated coefficients on the variables the exposures will be inter-
acted with, i.e., the variable that captures the change in US home prices and the variable 
Insolvency. The coefficient for the change in US home prices is negative in all models 
ranging between –4.058 and –5.234. This implies that a 5 index point decrease in US 
home prices (which is the largest drop that is observed but one that occurs in more than 
one quarter of the observations) increases the growth in domestic lending maximum by 
0.20 percentage points (= 0.05 x 4.058).  
These estimates suggest that a substitution effect may be taking place whereby home 
price declines in the US per se may lead to more lending in Germany overall. However, 
the coefficient is imprecisely estimated. Although the magnitude of this effect is not that 
large, our estimates of coefficients on the double and triple interactions with this variable 
presented below may gain further credence as this substitution effect (as we will see) is 
overturned when banks have exposures in the US. 
With respect to the insolvency ratio of the borrower’s region and industry, it decreases 
the growth in lending as expected. The interaction term of the change in US home prices 
                                                
24 To make the reading of our results easier we multiple the estimated coefficients by 100. 
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and insolvency appears to have an inverse relationship with the change in lending. The 
coefficients for both terms are negative in all specifications but statistically insignificant. 
4.3 Main Estimates on Exposures 
Let us now turn to the exposures and their interactions. Before investigating the three 
types that are directly related to the origins of the crisis, we estimate our model with the to-
tal exposure to the US real estate market that is the sum of the three types. We observe in 
the first three models in Table 7 that an increase in total US exposure by itself does not 
have an impact on the growth in domestic lending. Its interaction with changes in US home 
prices, for which the coefficient is estimated to equal 0.978***, however implies that follow-
ing a decrease by 5 index points in the S&P/Case–Shiller US National Home Price Index, 
a bank with a €1 billion total exposure to the US is estimated to contract its quarterly lend-
ing in Germany by 1.01 percentage points more than a bank with no such exposure. This 
is a large effect given that the mean (median) quarterly loan growth during the sample pe-
riod equals –2.48 (–0.71) percent or when considering that going in 2 years from peak to 
trough in home prices in the US (i.e., a drop by 60 index points, or 12 times the 5 index 
points assessment provided above) by itself would result in an extra cut in credit of more 
than 12 percentage points for firms borrowing from these exposed banks. The lower panel 
in Table 7 further details the economic relevancy assessment calculations.25 We also pro-
vide a vivid graphical illustration of these economic effects in Figures 2 and 3. 
This is our first main finding: German bank exposure to the US real estate market, and 
the possible losses emanating there as real estate prices in the US sagged, substantially 
contracted bank lending in Germany. This presents a direct link in terms of credit volume. 
Next, in Model 3 we interact insolvency as a measure of ex ante credit risk at the indus-
try–region level with the aforementioned terms. The estimated coefficient on the double in-
                                                
25 To assess economic relevancy, we rely on the amounts of €1 billion for total US exposure, real estate and conduit expo-
sures and €100 million for subprime exposure. This choice ensures ease and clarity of exposition, but it also broadly re-
spects the absolute and relative order of magnitudes of the standard deviations and means of the exposure variables (see 
Table 6). The standard deviation on real estate exposure equals €1 billion and on subprime €116 million. On conduits, the 
standard deviation equals €4.5 billion, while its mean equals €1.5 billion. Finally, recall that 5 index points in the 
S&P/Case–Shiller US National Home Price Index equals around two standard deviations for this index. 
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teraction term of exposure and insolvency equals –6.095*, while the estimated coefficient 
on the triple interaction term of exposure, US home prices and insolvency equals 
312.665**. The triple interaction implies that, following a decrease by 5 index points in US 
home prices, a bank with a €1 billion Total US exposure contracts its quarterly lending to 
firms in Germany in riskier industry–region combinations (i.e., those with a 1 percentage 
point higher insolvency rate) by an additional 3.24 percentage points (=312.665 x Ln(1 bil-
lion) x 0.05 x 0.01/100) more than a bank with no such exposure.26 Or, going in 2 years 
from peak to trough in home prices in the US by itself results in an extra cut in credit of al-
most 39 percentage points for riskier firms borrowing in Germany from these US real–
estate exposed banks. This is a large cut in access to credit for these riskier firms that may 
be almost totally reliant on bank credit for their financing needs. 
Hence, this is our second main finding: German bank exposure to the US real estate 
market overall and the possible losses emanating there as real estate prices in the US 
sagged, substantially shifted bank lending in Germany. A direct link in terms of credit com-
position, and clear evidence for a flight to quality. 
Total US exposure is defined as the sum of the exposures to the US real estate market 
and consists of direct lending to the real estate sector and the subprime lenders, and the 
indirect conduit exposure. However, we would also like to focus on each particular type of 
exposure that is linked to different aspects of the problems in the real estate sector in the 
US. Therefore it is of great interest to examine a direct exposure to the US real estate sec-
tor in order to have a cleaner measure. We first observe in Models 4, 5 and 6 in Table 7 
that US real estate exposure per se does not explain much of the changes in domestic 
lending, but that its interaction with US home prices in Model 5 strongly does. In the latter 
model, the estimated coefficient on the interaction equals 1.148***. This estimate implies 
that a bank with a €1 billion exposure to the US real estate sector, and following a de-
crease by 5 index points in the S&P/Case–Shiller US National Home Price Index, is esti-
                                                
26 A one percentage point increase in default rates is often observed during bad times (Jacobson, Lindé and Roszbach 
(2013)). We have to divide by 100 here as we had earlier rescaled the coefficients by 100 for easier reading. 
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mated to contract its quarterly lending in Germany by 1.19 percentage points more than a 
bank with no such exposure.27 This effect is slightly larger than the estimated coefficient in 
the previous set of exercises with total US exposure. 
The coefficient on the double interaction term of exposure and insolvency has a larger 
magnitude (–5.702), however it is imprecisely estimated. The coefficient on the triple inter-
action term of exposure, US home prices and insolvency equals 386.937**. Following a 
decrease by 5 index points in US home prices, a bank with a €1 billion exposure to US real 
estate is estimated to contract its quarterly lending in Germany to riskier firms by an addi-
tional 4.01 percentage points more than a bank with no such exposure. This is clearly a 
larger economic effect compared to the one found for total exposure to the US real estate 
market suggesting that the direct link in terms of credit composition exists and may com-
prise a large part of the exposure effect. 
In Models 7 to 9 in Table 7 we replace real estate with subprime exposure (which, as 
mentioned previously, is to subprime lenders and distinct from real estate exposure). All 
relevant estimated coefficients are imprecisely estimated probably due to the smaller 
amounts of exposures involved. 
Yet, the signs of most coefficients are as expected. For example, the estimates in Mod-
el 9 imply that a bank with a €100 million exposure to subprime lenders, and following a 
decrease by 5 index points in US home prices, contracts its quarterly lending in Germany 
by 0.38 percentage points overall, and to riskier firms by 0.98 percentage points more than 
a bank with no such exposure. Hence once more credit volume and composition in Ger-
many are affected by the possible losses that emanate from exposures combined with 
home price declines in the US. 
Finally, in Models 10 to 12 in Table 7 we introduce conduit exposure, which is very 
large on average. Indeed, the liquidity potentially provided to conduits is three times as 
high as US real estate exposure on average, and much larger than the amount lent to 
                                                
27 Notice that for more than half the sample observations, the German banks involved have zero real estate exposure in the 
US, marking these banks to be at once a relevant and ideal control group. 
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subprime lenders in our sample. However, we do not find evidence to argue that conduit 
exposure itself has an impact on lending in Germany. Yet the estimates in Model 11 show 
that a contraction in domestic lending is again spurred by US home prices dropping. A 
bank with a €1 billion exposure cuts lending by 1.47 percentage points more following a 
decrease by 5 index points in US home prices than a bank with zero exposure.28 
Finally, in Model 12 the estimated additional coefficients further imply that a bank with 
€1 billion in US conduits contracts its quarterly lending to riskier firms in Germany by 1.53 
percentage points more than banks without conduits in place, with the additional home 
price effect resulting in a contraction of 3.43 percentage points. 
In sum, credit volume and composition in Germany are affected by the possible losses 
that emanate from exposures, combined with US home price declines, on real estate, sub-
prime and conduits in the US. 
4.4 Further Controlling for Demand Effects 
Our identification strategy relies on bank–time level variation in exposures in the US, 
coupled with firm fixed effects that account for firm–level demand in Germany. However, 
borrowers may potentially contract their expenditures and reduce their demand for loans 
over time. In order to show the change in the credit amount for the same firm borrowing 
from multiple banks as in Khwaja and Mian (2008), we have to control for time varying 
firm–level demand. Due to the lack of multiplicity in relationships, i.e., few German firms 
engage multiple banks that are differentiated by their exposures in the US, including firm–
quarter fixed effects removes all the variation we are interested in. We employ two exer-
cises to account for time varying firm–level demand. 
First, we generate “firm–size times year” fixed effects (as in, e.g., Acharya et al. (2016), 
De Jonghe et al. (2016), De Jonghe et al. (2017)). We proxy firm size with the sum of total 
                                                
28 Conduits may not have entirely been invested in real estate or at all. For example, “credit arbitrage” ABCP conduits invest-
ed heavily in securitized assets, such as asset–backed securities backed by residential mortgages and commercial mort-
gages, and were consequently more exposed to subprime US residential mortgage loans than other types of conduits. 
Other ABCP conduits, such as “multi–seller” or “single–seller” conduits, had primarily funded unsecured receivables by the 
time the financial crisis arrived. It is currently impossible for us to distinguish between the different types of assets present 
in the conduits. 
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bank borrowing at firm level, and use the distribution of this variable to generate ten differ-
ent percentile dummies. For each size percentile we then generate a set of year–specific 
fixed effects. 
 
[Table 8 Here] 
 
We note that we lose significance for the interaction terms of total exposure and US real 
estate exposure. However, we do observe a much stronger effect for the conduit expo-
sure. Conduit exposure itself actually leads to a contraction in lending in Germany. This 
finding likely results from the sudden realization at the onset of the financial crisis that 
conduits “could come crashing back on the banks’ balance sheets” (actually optimal given 
potential reputational losses in, e.g., Segura (2017)), and banks taking appropriate action 
in terms of lending in Germany. 
The estimated coefficient of –0.349*** in Model 4 implies that a bank with €1 billion in 
US conduits is estimated to contract its quarterly lending in Germany by 7.23 percentage 
points more than banks without conduits in place. The double and triple interactions point 
to the same direction with larger magnitudes than previously estimated. However, the co-
efficient for the triple interaction is no longer statistically significant. 
Following Schnabl (2012), we include only firms that borrow from at least three lenders 
and re–estimate our model with firm–year fixed effects to control for time–varying firm de-
mand. We present the results in Table 9. 
 
[Table 9 Here] 
 
Our main finding remains unchanged: Banks with a higher exposure to the US real es-
tate sector cut their lending to German firms by more following a decrease in US home 
prices than banks that do not have such exposure. In this sample, also banks with a higher 
subprime exposure cut back domestic lending when US home prices go down. Moreover, 
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we observe that increases in all types of exposures lead to an increased lending to less 
risky industry–region combinations. Finally, the triple interaction terms confirm the shift in 
lending for banks with higher total US exposure, real estate exposure and for banks that 
provided more liquidity to conduits. 
4.5 Alternative Shock Measures 
One may argue that our three measures of exposures may be related to different 
shocks that occurred at different points in time. For instance, the third quarter of 2007 can 
be considered as a specific shock to the ABCP market when risk–averse investors started 
to avoid purchasing these commercial paper instruments (Acharya and Schnabl (2010); 
Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010)). However, we choose to employ a measure that flags 
problems the first and is also commonly considered the root cause of all ensuing prob-
lems, i.e., the turning point in home prices. 
As a robustness test, we employ an alternative approach and replace our continuous 
variable of the change in home prices with two newly–created dummies. The first one, 
Dummy Homeprices, is equal to one after the second quarter of the year 2006, i.e., when 
home prices started to drop, and equal to zero otherwise. This dummy variable is interact-
ed with the US real estate exposure and subprime exposure. The second dummy, Dummy 
ABCP Market, is equal to one after the second quarter of 2007, and equal to zero other-
wise, and captures the shock to the banks with conduit exposures. As before we find that 
both measures negatively determine the change in lending. The interaction term of the 
Dummy Homeprices with the exposures is inversely related to domestic lending, and this 
time seems to matter for the subprime exposure too. In other words, banks with US real 
estate exposure and subprime exposure cut back lending once US home prices start to 
decline. All remaining coefficients of interest have the expected sign but imprecisely esti-
mated possibly due to lower variation in the newly introduced dummies. 
 
[Table 10 Here] 
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4.6 Alternative Explanations 
4.6.1 Strategic Nature of German Bank Exposures in the US  
Our identification strategy relies on the timing of the shock, i.e., the exogenous changes 
in US home prices, and how these interact with bank exposures to the US real estate mar-
ket. But banks may have strategically chosen to expose themselves to the US real estate 
sector, subprime lenders and conduits. To deal with this issue we employ so far a strategy 
common in the literature by lagging bank exposures (à la Kashyap and Stein (2000) and 
Jiménez et al. (2012) for example). We also include bank fixed effects to mop all observa-
ble and unobservable time–invariant bank heterogeneity and many bank–level variables to 
account for as much time–varying bank heterogeneity as possible, in this way accounting 
for their risk taking incentives in the US real estate market as well. In this section we dis-
cuss what we do more. 
First, we start by controlling for a regional Herfindahl–Hirschmann Index in Germany 
since regional bank competition can affect bank strategy in a time–varying manner. We 
present the mostly unaffected results in Table A1 in an Internet Appendix available online. 
Next, we tighten pre–determination by lagging bank exposures by four quarters rather than 
by one quarter to further mitigate any impact of anticipation banks may have. The unaf-
fected results are in Table A2 in Appendix. Then, we instrument current exposures by past 
exposures and the one year lagged regional loan concentration (HHI). The unaffected re-
sults are in Table A3 in Appendix. Finally, we saturate specifications with bank–year fixed 
effects. Results are added to Table A3 as well.29  
4.6.2 Bank Type 
First, we account for spillovers to savings banks, which were indirectly exposed to sub-
prime mortgages through their holdings in Landesbanks Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2011). 
                                                
29 We acknowledge that, in this setting, it is very difficult to find an instrument that would satisfy the exclusion restrictions 
while being correlated with the endogeneous regressor. However we are confident that controlling for time varying bank 
heterogeneity takes care of these concerns. 
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This implies that a savings bank (without any exposure to the US real estate market itself) 
would cut back lending because of the Landesbank’s risky portfolio. Our research design 
does not account for this type of transmission mechanism, as our exposure measures are 
bank specific. In other words, the control group may indeed include banks that are indirect-
ly exposed to treatment. Although we aim to capture the initial shock, given the time peri-
od, spillovers to other banks may take place in our sample period, which may lead to an 
under–estimation of the impact. Therefore we exclude savings banks from the sample and 
re–estimate our model. 
The results, presented in Appendix Table A4, support our previous findings. There is 
still the overall contraction in domestic lending following the US home price shock for 
banks with higher total US exposure, US real estate exposure and conduit exposure. 
Moreover, these banks then also shift their lending to less riskier industry–region combina-
tions.  
Next, we examine which exposed banks reduce lending and search for higher quality 
assets. We split our sample as ‘well capitalized’ and ‘lowly capitalized banks’ (with the split 
set at 50 percent) and re–estimate our model. The results imply that well capitalized and 
exposed banks cut back lending when US home prices start to decline. However exposed 
banks with lower capital levels display the ‘flight to quality’ behavior by reducing lending to 
riskier industry–regions following the decline in home prices. The results are presented in 
Table A5. 
Finally, we consider the potential effects of a model–based regulation on credit risk as 
in Behn, Hasellmann and Vig (2014). We would like to rule out that our results are driven 
by the change in lending behavior by German banks with the introduction of the internal 
ratings–based regulation (IRB) where banks could choose between the new approach and 
the standard approach and get better risk weights. Information on IRB loans in the credit 
register is available after 2008. We employ IRB Share defined as IRB loans to total bank 
loan portfolio lagged by one quarter. We first control for this variable in our model, and 
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then interact it with the exposures, change in US home prices and the insolvency ratio to 
see if our initial results will be affected. While our main results with the double and triple in-
teractions remain unchanged, we also observe that the IRB loans by banks with the US to-
tal exposure and US real estate exposure experience a further reduction following a de-
crease in US home prices (Table A6). 
4.7 Impact on Firm Borrowing 
So far, we have documented changes in the composition of domestic lending: Exposed 
banks cut their lending to domestic firms by more following a decrease in US home prices 
than banks that do not have such exposure. Moreover, these banks also shift their lending 
to safer industry–region combinations. We are also interested to see the consequences of 
the so–called “flight to quality” behavior; in other words, the indirect impact on the real ac-
tivity. We investigate whether or not firms in riskier industry–region combinations are able 
to obtain funding from other banks when treated banks decrease lending to those firms. 
Similar to the approach in Schnabl (2012), we aggregate the data at the borrower firm lev-
el and explain total domestic borrowing with weighted bank exposures (weighted by the 
share of total borrowing from each lender). 
 
[Table 11 Here] 
 
Table 11 presents the estimation results that document a decrease in credit availability 
for borrowers of exposed banks when US home prices decline or when the borrowers be-
long to riskier industries and regions.30 This is indicated specifically by the negative and 
significant coefficient for all exposure types. Moreover, firms borrowing from banks that are 
exposed to the US real estate sector experience a higher reduction in borrowing when US 
home prices go down. Also firms in riskier industry–region combinations that are engaged 
                                                
30 The number of observations is higher than for our bank–firm analysis because we take an expansive approach to missing 
observations in the original data by aggregating all available information at the firm level which is appropriate if data avail-
ability across firm–bank–quarter combinations is random (which we assess it to be). 
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with banks with exposures to subprime lenders and conduits have an additional reduction 
in total borrowing. This finding is also in line with Popov and Rocholl (2017) who document 
that borrowers of affected banks experienced a significant decline in employment and in 
labor compensation after the crisis. 
5. Conclusion 
Motivated by the seminal works of Peek and Rosengren (1997) and Peek and 
Rosengren (2000), we study the international transmission of shocks through the German 
banking sector during the last financial turmoil triggered by the subprime mortgage crisis. 
In particular, using unique German bank exposure data, we investigate how exposures to 
the US real estate market influenced domestic lending in Germany. We are interested in 
total bank exposure to the US real estate market and its three salient components: Direct 
exposures to the US real estate sector and to the subprime lenders in the US, and indirect 
exposure as liquidity provided to ABCP conduits. 
Confirming previous studies on the transmission of shocks, we first document the over-
all contraction in lending in Germany following the home price shock. Our main aim is, 
however, to explore the heterogeneity in the contraction across banks and firms. In other 
words, we investigate whether differences in bank exposures to the US determine domes-
tic lending in Germany when home prices started to decline in the US, and whether there 
is a ‘flight to quality’ in lending for those banks that were more exposed to the US real es-
tate market. 
We indeed find that banks with higher total exposure to the US real estate market and, 
in particular, with higher exposure to the US real estate sector and to conduits contract 
their lending to German firms more following a decrease in US home prices than banks 
with no such exposure. Moreover, these banks also prefer lending to industry–region com-
binations with lower insolvency ratios, especially following a decrease in US home prices. 
31 
To sum up, we mainly document that possible losses abroad shift bank lending at home 
where the size of the effect depends on the type and the degree of exposure the bank has. 
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Domestic Lending Growth Exposed Banks and Unexposed Banks relate to the right axis, in percent,






The figure displays the mean values for US Real Estate Exposure, US Subprime Exposure and Conduit




















































































The figure shows the difference in the change in domestic bank lending in Germany between banks that have the indicated exposure in the US and that have no such exposure. The
























































Variable Name Definition and Measurement Data Source
Bank–firm level variable 
∆ Log Domestic Lending The change in the natural logarithm of domestic lending from time t–1 to time t by bank i to firm j Bundesbank Credit Register
Bank level variables
Log US Real Estate Exposure Natural logarithm of total direct exposure to the US real estate sector Bundesbank Credit Register
Log US Subprime Exposure Natural logarithm of total direct exposure to subprime lenders Bundesbank Credit Register
Log Conduit Exposure Natural logarithm of liquidity provided to asset–backed commerical paper (ABCP) conduits Moody's
Size Natural logarithm of total assets Bundesbank Bank Balance Sheet Data
Capital Capital ratio Bundesbank Bank Balance Sheet Data
Liquidity (Cash + balances with central banks + securities) to total assets Bundesbank Bank Balance Sheet Data
ROA Return on assets Bundesbank Bank Balance Sheet Data
NPL Non–performing loans to total loans Bundesbank Bank Balance Sheet Data
Deposits Deposits to total liabilities Bundesbank Bank Balance Sheet Data
CB Funding Central bank funding to total assets Bundesbank Bank Balance Sheet Data
Macro variable
∆ US Homeprices The change in the national US home price index S&P/Case–Shiller Home Price Indices
Firm industry–region variable
Insolvency The number of insolvencies divided by the total number of firms in an industry and region Destatis Insolvency Data & Turnover Tax Statistics
Table 1
Variable Definitions













Domestic Lending t € million 3.83 14.67 0.11 0.49 1.58 3.24 7.58
∆ Log Domestic Lending t Logarithmic change –0.025 0.341 –0.164 –0.036 –0.007 0.000 0.096
US Real Estate Exposure t–1 € million 370.30 981.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 86.74 1,309.28
Log US Real Estate Exposure t–1 Logarithm 6.75 9.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.28 20.99
US Subprime Exposure t–1 € million 31.34 115.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 63.24
Log US Subprime Exposure t–1 Logarithm 4.43 7.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.82 17.96
Conduit Exposure t–1 € million 1,469.02 4,536.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4,472.07
Log Conduit Exposure t–1 Logarithm 5.02 9.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.22
Total Assets t–1 € million 88,691.14 160,680.90 857.53 2,081.79 7,388.21 137,105.90 307,803.90
Size t–1 Logarithm 23.25 2.23 20.57 21.46 22.72 25.64 26.45
Capital t–1 Percentage 14.15 3.50 10.30 11.67 13.60 15.78 18.83
Liquidity t–1 Percentage 7.98 5.35 2.08 4.03 7.12 10.69 14.92
ROA t–1 Percentage 0.77 0.63 0.25 0.51 0.74 1.02 1.25
NPL t–1 Percentage 4.55 3.56 1.23 2.40 4.04 6.03 8.19
Deposits t–1 Percentage 23.75 15.24 0.61 9.98 25.97 35.19 42.59
CB Funding t–1 Percentage 1.61 2.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.39 5.20
∆ US Homeprices t Index change (%) –2.24 2.45 –5.22 –4.86 –2.6 –0.06 1.40
Insolvency t–1 Percentage 0.24 0.21 0.06 0.11 0.20 0.31 0.46
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for the Observations Used in the Regressions
This table provides the mean, standard deviation, 10th percentile, 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile and 90th percentile for all variables for the 1,664,262
observations used in the regressions. ∆ Log Domestic Lending t is corrected for outliers at the 1 percentile level.






Greece € million 284.64 269.77 14.88 0.35
Ireland € million 1,311.72 1,217.73 93.99 85.35
Portugal € million 1,715.69 1,593.12 122.57 0.55
Spain € million 10,613.89 9,215.53 1,398.36 28.21
Offshore Centers € million 13,625.11 12,193.87 1,431.23 982.51
US € million 31,041.15 27,337.69 3,703.47 265.95
All Foreign Countries € million 140,789.47 128,757.77 12,031.70 2,166.93
Banks
US € million 156,898.31 84,979.48 71,918.83 56,381.09
Offshore Centers € million 147,931.56 96,858.99 51,072.58 27,016.96
Banks' Total Portfolio € million 5,350,873.61 3,707,425.18 1,643,448.43 651,867.36
Table 3
Regional Distribution for Exposures by German Banks in 2007Q2
This table provides the real estate exposures taken from the Bundesbank credit register for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain,
offshore centers, the US and for all foreign countries in 2007Q2 for all German banks, including the big banks and the
Landesbanks. Additionally, it provides the exposure towards banks in the US, the exposure towards the offshore centers
and the banks' total portfolio. The banks' total portfolio does not comprise exposures to international organisations. The table
lists the total exposure, the balance–sheet exposure, the off–balance–sheet exposure and the derivatives calculated as the
sum of all German banks in millions of euro. For offshore centers, the Bundesbank definition is used. According to this















US Real Estate Exposure € million 1,547 17.67 195.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
US Real Estate Exposure / Total Assets Percentage 1,547 0.02 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
US Subprime Exposure € million 1,547 1.26 19.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
US Subprime Exposure / Total Assets Percentage 1,547 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Conduit Exposure € million 1,547 81.30 1,270.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Conduit Exposure / Total Assets Percentage 1,547 0.02 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Banks with US Real Estate Exposure € million 41 666.77 1,016.60 3.08 16.45 161.81 845.19 1,729.27
Banks with US Real Estate Exposure / Total Assets Percentage 41 0.92 1.69 0.02 0.06 0.33 1.03 2.20
Banks with US Subprime Exposure € million 78 25.08 83.12 1.89 2.04 4.99 12.45 29.98
Banks with US Subprime Exposure / Total Assets Percentage 78 0.27 0.27 0.02 0.05 0.18 0.42 0.68
Banks with Conduit Exposure € million 13 9,674.29 10,361.48 55.89 2,868.42 5,686.36 15,048.98 23,711.96
Banks with Conduit Exposure / Total Assets Percentage 13 2.83 2.09 0.11 1.24 2.90 3.45 5.51
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for Exposures by German Banks in the US in 2007Q2
This table provides the real estate, subprime and conduit exposures in the US in 2007Q2 for all German banks, including the big banks and the Landesbanks. The table lists
the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, 10th percentile, 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile and 90th percentile for all exposures in millions of euro.
Log US Real Estate Exposure Log US Subprime Exposure Log Conduit Exposure
Log US Real Estate Exposure 1
Log US Subprime Exposure 0.4894* 1
Log Conduit Exposure 0.7735* 0.3984* 1
Bank Type
with US Real Estate Exposure without US Real Estate Exposure
All Banks 41 1,506
Commerical banks 20 139
Big banks 5 0
Regional banks 5 130
Mortgage banks 10 9
Public sector banks 16 442
Landesbanks 11 1
Savings banks 5 441
All Cooperative banks 5 925
Cooperative central banks 2 0
Cooperative banks 3 925
 with US Subprime Exposure without US Subprime Exposure
All Banks 78 1,469
Commerical banks 14 145
Big banks 1 4
Regional banks 8 127
Mortgage banks 5 14
Public sector banks 41 417
Landesbanks 8 4
Savings banks 33 413
All Cooperative banks 23 907
Cooperative central banks 0 2
Cooperative banks 23 905
 with Conduit Exposure  without Conduit Exposure
All Banks 13 1,534
Commerical banks 4 155
Big banks 4 1
Regional banks 0 135
Mortgage banks 0 19
Public sector banks 7 451
Landesbanks 7 5
Savings banks 0 446
All Cooperative banks 2 928
Cooperative central banks 2 0
Cooperative banks 0 928
Table 5
Panel B : Number of Banks by Exposure and Bank Type in 2007Q2
Number of Observations
Panel A reports the correlations between exposure types, and the significance levels for a Pearson correlation test, while Panel B
lists the number of observations of banks by exposure type and bank type  in 2007Q2. * significant at 10%.










Domestic Lending € million 1,412,731 6.08 24.54 2,450,487 2.22 7.92
US Subprime Exposure € million 1,827,003 90.74 185.82 2,890,361 0.81 3.45
Conduit Exposure € million 1,827,003 4,798.17 7,605.05 2,890,361 0.00 0.00
Total Assets € million 1,826,999 271,374.60 215,268.00 2,889,950 7,842.87 13,472.22
Capital Percentage 1,777,098 13.98 3.48 2,869,058 14.01 3.63
Liquidity Percentage 1,826,946 7.14 4.51 2,767,824 8.23 5.68
ROA Percentage 1,810,322 0.43 0.46 2,881,715 1.02 1.20
NPL Percentage 1,810,322 2.95 2.37 2,881,063 5.36 5.46
Deposits Percentage 1,438,295 5.94 7.78 2,601,426 30.12 12.33
CB Funding Percentage 1,821,826 2.74 2.62 2,890,306 1.29 2.57
Domestic Lending € million 925,784 5.72 24.37 2,937,434 2.97 12.55
US Real Estate Exposure € million 1,157,278 1,216.53 1,584.37 3,560,086 190.70 684.35
Conduit Exposure € million 1,157,278 5,549.67 8,876.52 3,560,086 658.34 2,331.93
Total Assets € million 1,157,278 257,923.10 268,741.50 3,559,671 61,797.27 113,370.30
Capital Percentage 1,124,986 13.68 3.28 3,521,170 14.10 3.66
Liquidity Percentage 1,157,278 7.23 4.68 3,437,492 7.99 5.45
ROA Percentage 1,156,479 0.46 0.39 3,535,558 0.91 1.14
NPL Percentage 1,156,479 2.83 2.35 3,534,906 4.95 5.11
Deposits Percentage 877,500 10.04 13.31 3,162,221 24.69 15.10
CB Funding Percentage 1,157,278 2.32 2.68 3,554,854 1.70 2.66
Domestic Lending € million 914,750 5.89 25.82 2,948,468 2.93 11.68
US Real Estate Exposure € million 1,249,293 1,175.60 1,420.14 3,468,071 178.23 770.38
US Subprime Exposure € million 1,249,293 123.40 212.89 3,468,071 4.03 26.66
Total Assets € million 1,249,293 354,940.50 207,099.10 3,467,656 21,640.56 45,939.66
Capital Percentage 1,241,699 14.89 3.44 3,404,457 13.67 3.56
Liquidity Percentage 1,249,293 7.43 2.96 3,345,477 7.94 5.91
ROA Percentage 1,241,258 0.38 0.39 3,450,779 0.94 1.14
NPL Percentage 1,241,258 2.47 1.90 3,450,127 5.14 5.15
Deposits Percentage 1,101,002 3.45 2.95 2,938,719 28.27 13.32
CB Funding Percentage 1,249,293 2.68 1.91 3,462,839 1.55 2.85
Banks with Conduit Exposure Banks without Conduit Exposure
This table provides the number of observations, mean and standard deviation for all bank–specific variables, by bank exposures, for the full sample.
Table 6
Descriptive Statistics, by Bank Exposures
Banks with US Real Estate Exposure Banks without US Real Estate Exposure
Banks with US Subprime Exposure Banks without US Subprime Exposure
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Log Exposure = Log Total US Exposure Log US Real Estate Exposure Log US Subprime Exposure Log Conduit Exposure 
Log Exposure t–1 –0.006 0.003 0.001 –0.017 –0.007 –0.009 –0.003 0.001 0.001 –0.02 –0.006 –0.008
[0.013] [0.014] [0.014] [0.019] [0.021] [0.021] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
Log Exposure t–1 * ∆ US Homeprices t 0.978*** 1.035*** 1.148*** 1.204*** 0.416 0.402 1.414*** 1.499***
[0.288] [0.292] [0.332] [0.343] [0.338] [0.350] [0.434] [0.437]
Log Exposure t–1 * Insolvency t–1 –6.095* –5.702 1.330 –7.396*
[3.593] [4.177] [4.317] [4.169]
Log Exposure t–1 * ∆ US Homeprices t * Insolvency t–1 312.665** 386.937** 105.93 330.725*
[143.579] [156.078] [201.079] [171.839]
∆ US Homeprices t –5.169 –4.476 –4.398 –5.018 –4.155 –4.058 –5.168 –5.215 –5.16 –5.234 –4.308 –4.221
[3.471] [3.492] [3.485] [3.420] [3.415] [3.408] [3.494] [3.506] [3.504] [3.414] [3.456] [3.447]
Insolvency t–1 –9.041 –8.259 –13.46 –9.061 –8.604 –13.76 –8.963 –8.785 –14.439 –9.206 –8.415 –12.453
[19.557] [19.625] [19.828] [19.558] [19.603] [20.064] [19.556] [19.580] [18.963] [19.542] [19.633] [20.199]
∆ US Homeprices t * Insolvency t–1 –766.254 –713.86 –962.887 –857.229
[789.980] [792.499] [750.649] [783.057]
Size t–1 –0.041 –0.037 –0.038 –0.015 –0.01 –0.011 –0.053 –0.054 –0.054 –0.007 –0.005 –0.005
[0.049] [0.048] [0.048] [0.050] [0.047] [0.048] [0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.060] [0.062] [0.062]
Capital t–1 7.679 7.749 7.705 7.293 7.261 7.250 7.798 7.885 7.890 8.057 8.105 8.062
[7.346] [7.291] [7.295] [7.482] [7.411] [7.409] [7.030] [7.007] [7.007] [7.137] [7.087] [7.079]
Liquidity t–1 0.773 0.795 0.787 0.861 0.811 0.809 0.746 0.758 0.764 0.955 0.865 0.866
[1.150] [1.148] [1.149] [1.159] [1.159] [1.160] [1.155] [1.152] [1.152] [1.162] [1.156] [1.156]
ROA t–1 16.157 15.478 15.811 15.157 14.343 14.56 16.941 17.113 17.222 14.452 14.187 14.536
[24.206] [24.866] [24.831] [24.461] [24.862] [24.862] [23.304] [23.122] [23.144] [23.546] [24.746] [24.729]
NPL t–1 1.019 0.904 0.922 1.042 0.913 0.939 1.011 1.028 1.031 0.622 0.518 0.532
[3.194] [3.226] [3.229] [3.182] [3.223] [3.229] [3.179] [3.164] [3.165] [3.211] [3.300] [3.302]
Deposits t–1 3.970*** 4.032*** 4.037*** 3.829*** 3.890*** 3.893*** 4.027*** 4.044*** 4.046*** 3.800*** 3.892*** 3.891***
[0.636] [0.626] [0.626] [0.629] [0.620] [0.619] [0.648] [0.652] [0.651] [0.715] [0.689] [0.689]
CB Funding t–1 6.737*** 6.801*** 6.813*** 6.688*** 6.712*** 6.713*** 6.767*** 6.811*** 6.799*** 6.455*** 6.258*** 6.265***
[1.950] [1.977] [1.977] [1.939] [1.953] [1.955] [1.941] [1.965] [1.966] [2.012] [2.022] [2.021]
Constant –2.003*** –1.986*** –1.978*** –2.011*** –1.993*** –1.986*** –2.000*** –2.000*** –1.992*** –2.010*** –1.980*** –1.972***
[0.062] [0.062] [0.062] [0.063] [0.064] [0.064] [0.061] [0.061] [0.061] [0.062] [0.063] [0.063]
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262
R–squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Difference in Change in Domestic Bank Lending in Germany Between Banks That Have the Indicated Exposure in the US and That Have No Such Exposure
€1 Billion in Total US Exposure t–1 –0.0012 0.0006 0.0002
€1 Billion in US Real Estate Exposure t–1 –0.0035 –0.0015 –0.0019
€100 Million in US Subprime Exposure  t–1 –0.0006 0.0002 0.0002
€1 Billion in Conduit Exposure t–1 –0.0041 –0.0012 –0.0017
€1 Billion in Total US Exposure t–1 –0.0101 –0.0107
€1 Billion in US Real Estate Exposure t–1 –0.0119 –0.0125
€100 Million in US Subprime Exposure  t–1 –0.0038 –0.0037
€1 Billion in Conduit Exposure t–1 –0.0147 –0.0155
€1 Billion in Total US Exposure t–1 –0.0126
€1 Billion in US Real Estate Exposure t–1 –0.0118
€100 Million in US Subprime Exposure  t–1 0.0024
€1 Billion in Conduit Exposure t–1 –0.0153
€1 Billion in Total US Exposure t–1 –0.0324
€1 Billion in US Real Estate Exposure t–1 –0.0401
€100 Million in US Subprime Exposure  t–1 –0.0098
€1 Billion in Conduit Exposure t–1 –0.0343
The dependent variable is the quarter–on–quarter logarithmic change in domestic lending by banks to firms (Δ log Domestic Lending) and an ordinary least squares estimation is used. Table 1
contains all variable definitions. In our estimations, the measurement for Insolvency, Capital, Liquidity, ROA, NPL, Deposits and CB Funding are in ratios. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust
standard errors clustered at bank level are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are adjacent to the coefficient. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects is included.
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Table 7
Explaining the Change in Domestic Bank Lending in Germany Following Shocks to Exposures in the US
Additional Difference in Change in Domestic Bank Lending in Germany Following a 5 Index Point Decrease in US Homeprices Between Banks That Have the Indicated Exposure in the US and That 
Have No Such Exposure
Additional Difference in Change in Domestic Bank Lending to Firms in Industries–Regions With a 1 %p Higher Insolvency Rate in Germany Between Banks That Have the Indicated Exposure in the 
US and That Have No Such Exposure
Additional Difference in Change in Domestic Bank Lending to Firms in Industries–Regions With a 1 %p Higher Insolvency Rate in Germany Following a 5 Index Point Decrease in US Homeprices 
Between Banks That Have the Indicated Exposure in the US and That Have No Such Exposure
Model 1 2 3 4
Log Exposure = Log Total US Exposure Log US Real Estate Exposure Log US Subprime Exposure Log Conduit Exposure 
Log Exposure t–1 0.002 0.003 –0.027 –0.349***
[0.019] [0.033] [0.025] [0.081]
Log Exposure t–1 * ∆ US Homeprices t –0.398 –0.67 –2.683 29.996***
[0.788] [1.435] [1.731] [4.409]
Log Exposure t–1 * Insolvency t–1 –0.891 5.928 2.738 –48.725***
[7.595] [13.393] [5.870] [11.480]
Log Exposure t–1 * ∆ US Homeprices t * Insolvency t–1 159.438 753.507 –363.427** 1,399.74
[258.788] [527.603] [158.834] [976.151]
∆ US Homeprices t –19.936*** –19.995*** –18.408*** –25.327***
[3.057] [3.025] [2.919] [3.629]
Insolvency t–1 42.806*** 41.395*** 42.099** 51.491***
[15.614] [15.413] [16.428] [15.823]
∆ US Homeprices t * Insolvency t–1 –1,539.257** –1,526.999** –1,393.142** –2,047.858***
[654.163] [640.504] [663.835] [551.940]
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Size–Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262
R–squared 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028
Table 8
Explaining the Change in Domestic Bank Lending in Germany Following Shocks to Exposures in the US, Including Firm–Size–Year Fixed Effects
The dependent variable is the quarter–on–quarter logarithmic change in domestic lending by banks to firms (Δ log Domestic Lending) and an ordinary least squares estimation is used. Table
1 contains all variable definitions. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors clustered at bank level are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels
are adjacent to the coefficient. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects is included. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Model 1 2 3 4
Log Exposure = Log Total US Exposure Log US Real Estate Exposure Log US Subprime Exposure Log Conduit Exposure 
Log Exposure t–1 –0.042 –0.069** 0.028 –0.028
[0.026] [0.029] [0.019] [0.047]
Log Exposure t–1 * ∆ US Homeprices t 2.361* 2.630** 3.776* 2.311
[1.222] [1.267] [1.984] [1.454]
Log Exposure t–1 * Insolvency t–1 –24.889*** –25.747*** –12.198* –20.306**
[7.391] [8.042] [7.237] [8.080]
Log Exposure t–1 * ∆ US Homeprices t * Insolvency t–1 942.356*** 1,042.101*** 496.898 781.465*
[330.766] [348.612] [496.908] [426.614]
∆ US Homeprices t –9.192 –9.02 –12.246 –10.238
[11.062] [10.703] [10.537] [10.937]
Insolvency t–1 56.455 63.568 75.819 62.51
[66.827] [70.657] [54.839] [67.405]
∆ US Homeprices t * Insolvency t–1 –775.084 –891.038 –1379.58 –962.619
[3,295.780] [3,390.294] [3,268.091] [3,435.433]
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm–Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 258,040 258,040 258,040 258,040
R–squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Table 9
Explaining the Change in Domestic Bank Lending in Germany Following Shocks to Exposures in the US, Controlling for Firm Demand by Employing Only Firms with Multiple 
Lenders
The dependent variable is the quarter–on–quarter logarithmic change in domestic lending by banks to firms (Δ log Domestic Lending) and an ordinary least squares estimation is used. Table 2
contains all variable definitions. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors clustered at bank level are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are
adjacent to the coefficient. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects is included. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Log Exposure = Log US Real Estate Exposure Log US Subprime Exposure Log Conduit Exposure 
Dummy Shock = Dummy Homeprices Dummy Homeprices Dummy ABCP Market
Log Exposure t–1 –0.033* –0.02 –0.019 0.012 0.047*** 0.050*** –0.017 –0.016 –0.016
[0.018] [0.019] [0.020] [0.008] [0.014] [0.015] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011]
Log Exposure t–1 * Dummy Shock t –0.062* –0.067* –0.152*** –0.160*** –0.012 –0.014
[0.034] [0.035] [0.041] [0.045] [0.028] [0.028]
Log Exposure t–1 * Insolvency t–1 –6.006 –6.29 –6.442*
[4.809] [6.527] [3.763]
Log Exposure t–1 * Dummy Shock t * Insolvency t–1 7.618 31.018 1.258
[15.955] [21.985] [10.837]
Dummy Shock t –2.691*** –2.717*** –2.785*** –2.694*** –2.813*** –2.885*** –2.019*** –2.020*** –2.056***
[0.220] [0.214] [0.216] [0.222] [0.238] [0.242] [0.234] [0.231] [0.234]
Insolvency t–1 –29.92 –30.101 –78.088*** –30.275 –30.206 –82.779*** –30.428 –30.505 7.059
[19.760] [19.741] [23.128] [19.833] [19.749] [23.573] [19.769] [19.715] [20.499]
Dummy Shock t * Insolvency t–1 228.977*** 248.198*** –247.375***
[65.552] [68.088] [51.922]
Size t–1 –0.027 –0.025 –0.025 –0.120* –0.123* –0.124* –0.067 –0.065 –0.066
[0.057] [0.056] [0.056] [0.064] [0.065] [0.065] [0.072] [0.073] [0.073]
Capital t–1 12.387* 12.311* 12.317* 14.676** 14.843** 14.899** 12.860* 12.781* 12.751*
[7.331] [7.323] [7.325] [7.033] [7.004] [7.007] [7.176] [7.103] [7.095]
Liquidity t–1 1.827 1.799 1.808 1.604 1.679 1.685 2.239** 2.208** 2.199*
[1.148] [1.150] [1.148] [1.166] [1.172] [1.170] [1.133] [1.125] [1.122]
ROA t–1 –3.509 –3.961 –4.142 0.917 3.132 2.819 1.379 1.225 1.392
[25.002] [24.841] [24.808] [25.343] [24.141] [24.223] [24.668] [24.644] [24.555]
NPL t–1 –2.08 –2.151 –2.19 –2.228 –2.397 –2.462 –1.501 –1.452 –1.53
[3.030] [3.039] [3.037] [3.087] [3.025] [3.024] [3.018] [2.999] [2.991]
Deposits t–1 2.760*** 2.775*** 2.752*** 3.200*** 3.122*** 3.101*** 2.491*** 2.514*** 2.501***
[0.581] [0.577] [0.578] [0.657] [0.665] [0.667] [0.706] [0.682] [0.683]
CB Funding t–1 7.717*** 7.758*** 7.746*** 7.811*** 7.801*** 7.754*** 5.543*** 5.547*** 5.514***
[1.650] [1.636] [1.638] [1.656] [1.671] [1.677] [2.058] [2.050] [2.050]
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262
R–squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Table 10
Explaining the Change in Domestic Bank Lending in Germany Following Shocks to Exposures in the US, for Alternative Shock Measures
The dependent variable is the quarter–on–quarter logarithmic change in domestic lending by banks to firms (Δ log Domestic Lending) and an ordinary least squares estimation is used. Dummy Homeprices is
equal to one after the second quarter of the year 2006, i.e., when home prices started to drop, and equal to zero otherwise. Dummy ABCP Market, is equal to one after the second quarter of 2007, and equal
to zero otherwise, and captures the shock to the banks with conduit exposures. Table 1 contains all other variable definitions. In our estimations, the measurement for Insolvency, Capital, Liquidity, ROA,
NPL, Deposits and CB Funding are in ratios. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors clustered at bank level are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are
adjacent to the coefficient. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects is included. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Model 1 2 3 4
Log Exposure = Log Total US Exposure Log US Real Estate Exposure Log US Subprime Exposure Log Conduit Exposure 
Log Exposure t–1 –0.342*** –0.446*** –0.156*** –0.480***
[0.013] [0.016] [0.011] [0.015]
Log Exposure t–1 * ∆ US Homeprices t 0.276* 0.444*** –0.042 –0.076
[0.158] [0.166] [0.209] [0.170]
Log Exposure t–1 * Insolvency t–1 1.303 3.486 –4.714* –6.256***
[2.202] [2.332] [2.688] [2.352]
Log Exposure t–1 * ∆ US Homeprices t * Insolvency t–1 75.956 74.564 14.659 4.695
[54.746] [57.972] [72.890] [60.301]
∆ US Homeprices t –15.396*** –14.673*** –13.166*** –16.370***
[2.418] [2.306] [2.273] [2.163]
Insolvency t–1 –19.56 –32.532 21.626 48.980*
[30.548] [29.074] [26.916] [26.694]
∆ US Homeprices t * Insolvency t–1 –1,655.229** –1,369.947** –966.956 –703.299
[720.092] [666.075] [660.651] [607.805]
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls (aggregated) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,819,124 1,819,124 1,819,124 1,819,124
R–squared 0.140 0.141 0.140 0.141
Table 11
Impact on Firm Borrowing
The dependent variable is the quarter–on–quarter logarithmic change in domestic lending by banks to firms (Δ log Domestic Lending) aggregated at the firm level and an ordinary least squares
estimation is used. Table 1 contains all other variable definitions. In our estimations, the measurement for Insolvency, Capital, Liquidity, ROA, NPL, Deposits and CB Funding are in ratios.
Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors clustered at bank level are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are adjacent to the coefficient.
"Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects is included. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Appendix 
Model 1 2 3 4
Log Exposure = Log Total US Exposure Log US Real Estate Exposure Log US Subprime Exposure Log Conduit Exposure 
Log Exposure t–1 0.001 –0.010 0.000 –0.009
[0.014] [0.021] [0.010] [0.015]
Log Exposure t–1 * ∆ US Homeprices t 1.029*** 1.199*** 0.392 1.484***
[0.293] [0.345] [0.344] [0.440]
Log Exposure t–1 * Insolvency t–1 –6.142* –5.745 1.266 –7.565*
[3.594] [4.176] [4.348] [4.163]
Log Exposure t–1 * ∆ US Homeprices t * Insolvency t–1 310.638** 385.270** 102.23 326.546*
[143.858] [156.734] [201.535] [171.881]
Log Exposure t–1 * HHI t–1 0.147 0.551 0.897 0.824
[0.913] [1.011] [1.542] [1.096]
Log Exposure t–1 * ∆ US Homeprices t * HHI t–1 41.697 30.165 45.745 67.782
[47.671] [53.483] [46.640] [54.434]
∆ US Homeprices t –4.599 –4.259 –5.373 –4.441
[3.467] [3.394] [3.481] [3.434]
Insolvency t–1 –13.281 –13.535 –14.166 –12.285
[19.798] [20.044] [18.975] [20.196]
∆ US Homeprices t * Insolvency t–1 –775.291 –722.433 –970.876 –861.911
[787.862] [790.699] [747.339] [781.125]
HHI t–1 –9.08 –9.159 –9.883 –8.776
[6.857] [6.878] [6.913] [6.769]
∆ US Homeprices t * HHI t–1 446.053** 437.156** 412.403** 446.059**
[205.742] [208.007] [192.425] [201.480]
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262
R–squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Table A1
Explaining the Change in Domestic Bank Lending in Germany Following Shocks to Exposures in the US, Controlling for Regional Competition 
The dependent variable is the quarter–on–quarter logarithmic change in domestic lending by banks to firms (Δ log Domestic Lending) and an ordinary least squares estimation
is used. Table 1 contains all variable definitions. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors clustered at bank level are reported in the row below, and the
corresponding significance levels are adjacent to the coefficient. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects is included. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant
at 10%.
Model 1 2 3 4
Log Exposure = Log Total US Exposure Log US Real Estate Exposure Log US Subprime Exposure Log Conduit Exposure 
Log Exposure t–4 –0.004 –0.010 –0.020** 0.017
[0.013] [0.022] [0.010] [0.018]
Log Exposure t–4 * ∆ US Homeprices t 0.872*** 1.239*** 0.532 1.143**
[0.301] [0.353] [0.399] [0.459]
Log Exposure t–4 * Insolvency t–1 –7.149** –5.626 –5.107 –5.357
[3.536] [4.119] [4.610] [4.087]
Log Exposure t–4 * ∆ US Homeprices t * Insolvency t–1 348.633** 421.766*** 128.78 355.672**
[139.772] [159.586] [198.047] [166.560]
∆ US Homeprices t –4.429 –4.032 –5.210 –4.361
[3.488] [3.426] [3.499] [3.487]
Insolvency t–1 –16.029 –14.001 –14.832 –11.799
[19.858] [20.173] [19.173] [19.916]
∆ US Homeprices t * Insolvency t–1 –730.026 –670.592 –891.853 –808.022
[786.038] [791.588] [770.479] [796.296]
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262
R–squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Table A2
Explaining the Change in Domestic Bank Lending in Germany Following Shocks to Exposures in the US, with Four Lags of Bank Exposures
The dependent variable is the quarter–on–quarter logarithmic change in domestic lending by banks to firms (Δ log Domestic Lending) and an ordinary least squares
estimation is used. Table 1 contains all variable definitions. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors clustered at bank level are reported in the row below,
and the corresponding significance levels are adjacent to the coefficient. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects is included. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%.
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Log Exposure = Log Total US 
Exposure 
Log US Real 
Estate 
Exposure




Log Total US 
Exposure 
Log US Real 
Estate 
Exposure




Log Exposure t–1 –0.025 –0.020 –0.017 –0.036 –0.009 –0.016 0.004 –0.016
[0.020] [0.026] [0.043] [0.033] [0.012] [0.018] [0.012] [0.014]
Log Exposure t–1 * ∆ US Homeprices t 1.251*** 1.460*** 0.958 1.678*** 0.477 0.672 –0.073 0.538
[0.404] [0.435] [0.907] [0.616] [0.452] [0.540] [0.602] [0.632]
Log Exposure t–1 * Insolvency t–1 –8.933** –5.326 –28.469** –3.421 –7.642** –7.614** 1.162 –7.681**
[4.133] [4.449] [12.141] [4.901] [3.573] [3.668] [3.153] [3.407]
Log Exposure t–1 * ∆ US Homeprices t * Insolvency t–1 342.135** 402.265** 567.842 314.483 306.913** 351.410** 154.714 264.594*
[158.559] [159.365] [497.101] [191.838] [134.646] [144.934] [187.637] [148.818]
∆ US Homeprices t –4.166 –3.719 –5.181 –4.12 0.383 0.648 0.290 0.206
[3.609] [3.511] [3.619] [3.557] [4.257] [4.277] [4.125] [4.171]
Insolvency t–1 –4.594 –2.549 –2.142 –0.106 –44.838*** –45.393*** –45.911*** –41.708**
[19.708] [19.339] [22.123] [19.527] [16.972] [17.296] [17.542] [17.350]
∆ US Homeprices t * Insolvency t–1 –406.89 –303.32 –98.805 –421.878 –825.953 –791.329 –823.465 –958.332
[825.725] [815.890] [867.495] [820.746] [781.956] [795.214] [796.323] [783.206]
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank–Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,550,945 1,550,945 1,550,945 1,550,945 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262
R–squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
 Instrumental Variables Estimation and Bank–Year Fixed Effects
Table A3
The dependent variable is the quarter–on–quarter logarithmic change in domestic lending by banks to firms (Δ log Domestic Lending). In the first four models, an instrumental variable estimation is used. Log
Total US Exposure, Log US Real Estate Exposure, Log US Subprime Exposure and Log Conduit Exposure are instrumented with their lags of one year and the one year lagged regional Herfindahl–Hirschman
Index of the German banking market. In the last four models, an ordinary least squares estimation is used. Table 1 contains all variable definitions. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors
clustered at bank level are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are adjacent to the coefficient. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects is included. *** Significant at 1%, **
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Explaining the Change in Domestic Bank Lending in Germany Following Shocks to Exposures in the US,      
1 2 3 4
Log Exposure = Log Total US Exposure Log US Real Estate Exposure Log US Subprime Exposure Log Conduit Exposure 
Log Exposure t–1 0.00902 –0.02168 0.00124 –0.01259
[0.025] [0.037] [0.015] [0.020]
Log Exposure t–1 * ∆ US Homeprices t 1.08116** 1.06349** 0.07454 1.56213***
[0.468] [0.526] [0.507] [0.588]
Log Exposure t–1 * Insolvency t–1 –7.45529 –7.33312 3.90437 –9.62008*
[4.747] [5.554] [5.241] [5.006]
Log Exposure t–1 * ∆ US Homeprices t * Insolvency t–1 409.64692* 418.32402* 115.71473 303.48627
[226.655] [234.251] [254.753] [257.333]
∆ US Homeprices t 4.51103 4.78832 4.0369 4.12377
[6.740] [6.628] [6.870] [6.567]
Insolvency t–1 –15.80917 –16.57883 –24.74615 –12.53831
[26.709] [26.897] [26.398] [28.100]
∆ US Homeprices t * Insolvency t–1 –266.13393 –279.07627 –492.50132 –482.86938
[1,085.685] [1,092.914] [977.681] [1,117.735]
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 794,728 794,728 794,728 794,728
R–squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Table A4
Explaining the Change in Domestic Bank Lending in Germany Following Shocks to Exposures in the US, Excluding Savings Banks
The dependent variable is the quarter–on–quarter logarithmic change in domestic lending by banks to firms (Δ log Domestic Lending) and an ordinary least squares estimation
is used. Table 1 contains all variable definitions. In our estimations, the measurement for Insolvency, Capital, Liquidity, ROA, NPL, Deposits and CB Funding are in ratios.
Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors clustered at bank level are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are adjacent to the
coefficient. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects is included. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Model 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Log Exposure = Log Total US 
Exposure 
Log US Real 
Estate 
Exposure




Log Total US 
Exposure 
Log US Real 
Estate 
Exposure




Log Exposure t–1 –0.01 –0.013 –0.008 –0.028** 0.008 –0.014 0.001 0.057***
[0.022] [0.026] [0.019] [0.014] [0.014] [0.023] [0.014] [0.019]
Log Exposure t–1 * ∆ US Homeprices t 0.332 0.278 –0.742 0.813 1.301*** 1.819*** 1.190*** 2.242***
[0.391] [0.487] [0.566] [0.504] [0.321] [0.398] [0.456] [0.519]
Log Exposure t–1 * Insolvency t–1 –5.729 –3.749 3.917 –6.813 –6.67 –8.837 –5.735 –10.847
[4.940] [5.641] [5.565] [5.018] [5.696] [7.013] [6.957] [7.826]
Log Exposure t–1 * ∆ US Homeprices t * Insolvency t–1 419.559** 503.937** 199.161 366.457* 137.096 173.911 –299.686 167.974
[185.596] [211.841] [239.102] [198.678] [227.650] [260.560] [306.835] [333.290]
∆ US Homeprices t 8.942 9.19 10.073 8.109 –12.137*** –11.225*** –13.498*** –11.120***
[7.392] [7.341] [7.697] [7.297] [2.349] [2.287] [2.309] [2.290]
Insolvency t–1 –14.507 –18.951 –34.864 –10.363 –13.759 –17.806 –6.561 –20.192
[25.521] [25.791] [27.348] [25.171] [33.006] [33.761] [30.209] [30.840]
∆ US Homeprices t * Insolvency t–1 –739.893 –799.486 –690.486 –807.085 –1353.678 –1296.381 –1,968.376* –1279.984
[1,005.612] [1,007.834] [882.583] [1,074.083] [1,283.119] [1,338.838] [1,114.385] [1,156.988]
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 716,628 716,628 716,628 716,628 947,634 947,634 947,634 947,634
R–squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
The dependent variable is the quarter–on–quarter logarithmic change in domestic lending by banks to firms (Δ log Domestic Lending) and an ordinary least squares estimation is used. Table 1 contains all
variable definitions. In our estimations, the measurement for Insolvency, Capital, Liquidity, ROA, NPL, Deposits and CB Funding are in ratios. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors
clustered at bank level are reported in the row below, and the corresponding significance levels are adjacent to the coefficient. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects is included. *** Significant at 1%, **
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Low Capital High Capital
Table A5
Explaining the Change in Domestic Bank Lending in Germany Following Shocks to Exposures in the US, for a Sample Split Based on Bank Capital
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Log Exposure = Log Total US Exposure Log US Real Estate Exposure Log US Subprime Exposure Log Conduit Exposure 
Log Exposure t–1 0.007 0.00509 –0.00095 –0.00297 –0.0002 –0.00163 –0.00196 0.00119
[0.015] [0.014] [0.023] [0.022] [0.010] [0.010] [0.015] [0.017]
Log Exposure t–1 * ∆ US Homeprices t 0.97823*** 0.99268*** 1.12349*** 1.17857*** 0.49103 0.52459 1.41372*** 1.59333***
[0.278] [0.275] [0.311] [0.286] [0.342] [0.346] [0.420] [0.409]
Log Exposure t–1 * Insolvency t–1 –5.92956* –4.05534 –5.43828 –2.78622 1.3787 2.35195 –7.06601* –5.9118
[3.598] [3.774] [4.191] [4.248] [4.309] [4.245] [4.182] [4.261]
Log Exposure t–1 * ∆ US Homeprices t * Insolvency t–1 325.10072** 335.70385** 398.71946** 443.12213** 115.79313 205.86669 339.00083** 332.39975*
[144.064] [165.477] [156.885] [178.295] [200.969] [218.710] [172.540] [201.744]
Log Exposure t–1 * IRB Share t–1 –0.08375** –0.09443** –0.04352 0.00023
[0.040] [0.043] [0.050] [0.042]
Log Exposure t–1 * ∆ US Homeprices t * IRB Share t–1 –2.98146*** –2.95363*** –1.45148 –1.06495
[1.025] [1.021] [1.005] [1.122]
Log Exposure t–1 *  Insolvency t–1 * IRB Share t–1 3.7415 3.02588 5.27365 –11.22156
[12.099] [13.548] [14.540] [12.077]
Log Exposure t–1 * ∆ US Homeprices t * Insolvency t–1 * IRB Share t–1 356.42227 155.3879 –151.08772 120.94927
[377.782] [416.288] [507.736] [429.434]
∆ US Homeprices t –5.22956* –4.51887 –4.95629 –4.24186 –5.98023* –5.81353* –4.98381 –4.62019
[3.156] [3.073] [3.053] [2.948] [3.171] [3.159] [3.167] [3.053]
Insolvency t–1 –13.72029 –13.0777 –14.00409 –11.32533 –15.04075 –14.02091 –12.62593 –6.1002
[19.939] [18.942] [20.177] [18.859] [19.066] [20.216] [20.275] [19.375]
∆ US Homeprices t * Insolvency t–1 –767.32425 –993.63017 –714.7775 –729.28174 –975.98536 –1200.3916 –859.43846 –932.45579
[787.190] [907.818] [790.996] [919.422] [747.683] [858.974] [780.583] [874.090]
IRB Share t–1 –0.86985** –0.99210** –0.84224** –0.92725* –0.91877** –0.88224* –0.81197** –1.05264**
[0.409] [0.494] [0.419] [0.490] [0.413] [0.485] [0.376] [0.470]
∆ US Homeprices t * IRB Share t–1 –5.78559 –6.22382 1.39726 –8.88572
[10.912] [10.678] [9.794] [11.500]
 Insolvency t–1 * IRB Share t–1 –118.163 –135.98929* –161.16039 –76.50652
[87.273] [77.854] [101.611] [88.289]
∆ US Homeprices t * Insolvency t–1 * IRB Share t–1 99.24952 –759.61757 2,069.59 292.95277
[3,737.586] [3,578.902] [3,097.299] [3,906.305]
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262 1,664,262
R–squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Explaining the Change in Domestic Bank Lending in Germany Following Shocks to Exposures in the US, and the Use of Internal Models
Table A6
The dependent variable is the quarter–on–quarter logarithmic change in domestic lending by banks to firms (Δ log Domestic Lending) and an ordinary least squares estimation is used. IRB
Share is defined as the volume of IRB loans to the total bank loan portfolio. Table 1 contains all variable definitions. In our estimations, the measurement for Insolvency, Capital, Liquidity, ROA,
NPL, Deposits and CB Funding are in ratios. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors clustered at bank level are reported in the row below, and the corresponding
significance levels are adjacent to the coefficient. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects is included. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
